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Job Creation and Destruction in Northern
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STEPHEN ROPER*
Aston Business School, Birmingham
Abstract: Job creation and destruction estimates are made for Northern Ireland manufacturing
using the ARD database. International comparisons suggest job creation and destruction rates in
Northern Ireland were below those elsewhere. Job turnover rates exhibit the standard properties,
however, with counter-cyclical job destruction and pro-cyclical job creation. A number of other key
results emerge. First, small firms are the only size band for which the net change in employment
was positive. Second, job turnover in small firms is less cyclical than that in larger companies.
Third, firm contraction and expansion were more important sources of job creation and
destruction in Northern Ireland than in the UK as a whole. 
I INTRODUCTION
J
ob creation has dominated the economic development agenda in Northern
Ireland for the last three decades. Motivated by high levels of
unemployment and the potential socio-political benefits of economic
development, substantial public resources have been devoted both to
attracting inward investment and supporting existing businesses. The key
question is how effective have these efforts been in creating and sustaining
employment? Some past attempts have been made to answer this question.
Gudgin  et al. (1989), for example, considered job generation in Northern
Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and the East Midlands over the 1973-1986
183
*Acknowledgements:  I am grateful to Fiona Hepper and Lisa Taylor at the Department of
Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Belfast for providing access to the ARD database. I am also
grateful to Michael Anyadike-Danes for suggesting the original idea for the paper and Jessica
Doyle for excellent research assistance. Bobbie Clulow (Department of Enterprise, Trade and
Investment), Mike Crone, and Mary Trainor (Queen’s University Belfast) made useful comments
on an earlier draft. Valuable comments were also received from Donal O’Neill and two anonymous
referees.period while a series of studies using a similar methodology have examined job
creation among small firms (Gudgin et al., 1989; Hart, 1989; Hart and Scott,
1994; Hart and Hanvey, 1995; Buckland 1996). Recent theoretical
developments, particularly the job creation and destruction methodology
developed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Davis, Haltiwanger and
Schuh (DHS, 1996), and the availability of a new longitudinal dataset for
Northern Ireland manufacturing, however, suggest the potential value of
revisiting the issue of job creation and enable job change in Northern Ireland
to be considered in an international context. 
The main aims of this paper are, therefore, to make estimates of job
creation and destruction in Northern Ireland over the 1973-1993 period and
consider these in the context of other international evidence. Our estimates
allow us to get behind the net changes in total employment to see the
underlying  gross flows, i.e., the actual number of jobs being created or
destroyed in each year. This is important as industrial policy, particularly in
respect of inward investment or new firm formation, works primarily on the
gross flow into employment as firms are established and new jobs created.
Policy may also work on reducing job destruction if, as in Northern Ireland,
firms are also given support to ‘safeguard’ jobs when redundancies are
threatened. Other influences, particularly the ‘troubles’, may also have been
an important negative influence on inward investment flows into Northern
Ireland over the period considered.1 Gross flows are also important, however,
as they provide an indication of the overall extent of structural change or
structural adjustment taking place in an economy at any point in time.
Previous studies using a job creation and destruction approach have
suggested, perhaps unsurprisingly, that overall job turnover is counter-
cyclical, particularly among larger businesses (e.g., Broersma and Gautier,
1997; Konings, 1995). Smaller firms are also typically found to have higher
overall job creation and destruction rates than larger businesses, i.e. to exhibit
higher levels of job turnover, but to be less sensitive to the business cycle.2
Perhaps the most striking feature of previous job creation and destruction
studies, however, is the sheer scale of the gross flows that can underlie small
net changes in total employment. Barnes and Haskel (2000), for example, in
their study of job creation and destruction in UK manufacturing from 1980-
1991 identified a total net job loss of 1.93 million. This was the result of gross
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1 Fielding (2003), for example, demonstrates the negative impact of civil unrest on investment
levels in Northern Ireland but also notes the compensating positive effect of higher levels of public
support for new investment at least compared to other UK regions. 
2 See, for example, on the UK: Blanchflower and Burgess, (1996); Barnes and Haskel, (2000) and,
for the Netherlands: Broersma and Gautier (1997). job creation of 6.01 million and job destruction of 7.94 million (Barnes and
Haskel, 2000, p. 7). In Northern Ireland over the longer 1973-1993 period, we
identify a similar pattern, with gross job creation and job destruction 2–2.5
times larger on average than the resultant net changes in employment. 
Our analysis is based on the Annual Respondents Database (ARD) which
is the historical consolidation of the Annual Census of Production
(ACOP)/Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). This provides longitudinal data on
individual manufacturing establishments over the post-1971 period allowing
not only the estimation of job and destruction at a regional level but some
decomposition by time period, firm size, industry and ownership. At the UK
level, the ARD database has been used by Barnes and Haskel (2000) to
estimate job creation and destruction. Differences in sampling methodology
between the Northern Ireland ACOP and that in the rest of the UK, however,
suggest the value of an alternative (enterprise-based) approach to estimating
job creation and destruction in Northern Ireland. In addition, we are able to
extend the time period over which Barnes and Haskel (2000) were able to
make estimates of job creation and destruction, and also – because of the
relatively small scale of Northern Ireland – we were able to undertake a very
detailed data cleaning exercise to eliminate potential employment volatility
due to survey irregularities. Our empirical approach is described in detail in
Section II which also provides an overview of the job creation and destruction
methodology. Section III focuses on the main job creation and destruction
series for Northern Ireland manufacturing as a whole and outlines a broad
industrial decomposition. Section IV compares our Northern Ireland estimates
to those of Barnes and Haskel (2000) for the UK, Strobl et al. (1998) for Ireland
and a range of other international studies. Key issues here are how job
creation and destruction rates, persistence and cyclicality in Northern Ireland
compare to that elsewhere. Sections V and VI then report estimates of job
creation and destruction by firm size and ownership relating these to the
industrial development context in Northern Ireland and other studies with
similar focus but different methodologies. Our analysis suggests marked
differences in the job creation record of firms in different industrial sectors
and of smaller and larger firms. 
II DATAAND METHODS
(a) Job Creation and Destruction
Analysis of aggregate employment levels and their trends can mask
substantial heterogeneity in employment adjustment by individual firms or
sectors. In any period, for example, one firm may be expanding while another
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is reducing its employment, creating little change in total employment but
with significant job turnover at the level of the individual firm. The job
creation and destruction methodology focuses on these employment flows,
rather than changes in the gross employment stock, exposing the underlying
dynamics of employment change. More specifically, job creation is said to arise
when a firm is either born (i.e. enters) or expands its employment. Job
destruction occurs when a firm either closes (i.e. dies) or contracts its
employment. Net employment change in any period is then the difference
between total job creation and total job destruction. 
In more precise terms, and following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), job
creation at time t, JCt is defined as 
JCt =  i S, ∆Ni>0(Nit – Nit–1) =   i ENit
where  N is employment and i denotes the plant or firm, S is the set of
surviving plants and E is the set of new entrants. Similarly, job destruction is
measured as: 
JDt =  i S, ∆Ni<0 |(Nit – Nit–1)| +   i XNit–1
where X is the set of firms which closed between periods t-1 and t. The first
term here therefore denotes job destruction in contracting firms and the
second term, job destruction in exiting firms. 
Job creation and destruction figures are themselves instructive, but being
measured in absolute terms they depend on the size of the region or industry
being examined. To make comparisons between areas and time periods it is
therefore useful to calculate job creation and destruction rates. One difficulty
here is that for new entrants no baseline employment exists against which job
creation can be measured. To overcome this problem DHS use average
employment at the beginning and end of a year to assess the growth rate of a




where 2 ≥ git≥ –2 and takes value 2 for a new firm (i.e. where Nit–1 = 0) and –2
for an exiting firm (i.e. where Nt = 0). The job creation rate JCRt is then
defined as an employment weighted average of the growth rates of expanding
survivors and entrants. That is:(1/2)(Nit + Nit–1)
JCRt =  i S, i E, ∆Ni>0 –––––––––––––– git
(1/2)(Nt + Nt–1)
where Nt is total employment at time t. Similarly, the job destruction rate is
defined as an employment weighted average of the growth rates of contracting
and closing firms, viz. 
(1/2)(Nit + Nit–1)
JDRt =  i S, i X, ∆Ni<0 ––––––––––––––  |git|
(1/2)(Nt + Nt–1)
Following DHS it is also possible to define three other useful ratios. First,
the net employment growth rate, the difference between the job creation and
job destruction rate: 
NEGt = JCRt – JDRt.
Second, the gross job reallocation rate, the sum of the job creation and
destruction rates
JRAt = JCRt + JDRt.
Third, the excess job reallocation rate 
XRAt = JRAt –| NEGt|.
Job creation and destruction flows and rates are readily calculable for all
firms. More difficulty arises, however, when we wish to examine job creation
and destruction by either firm size or ownership. In both cases problems arise
because of the potential for transitions due to business growth (or contraction)
or ownership changes. In the case of firm size, two main approaches have been
used (see Barnes and Haskel, 2000) based on classifying firms by either their
initial or average employment. As we shall see the two approaches can yield
different results. 
In terms of ownership, a similar situation exists with the potential for
transfers between ownership categories. Here we consider two categories of
ownership (UK or non-UK owned) with the potential for ownership transfers
in either direction.3 Conceptually, a firm transfer from, say, UK to non-UK
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3 This categorisation is essentially dictated by the structure of the ARD data. This identifies
establishments by their country of ownership but gives no regional ownership indicator. We
cannot therefore distinguish between an establishment owned by a Northern Ireland based parent
and an establishment owned by a company based in Scotland or the West Midlands. Plants owned
by companies based in the Republic of Ireland are included in the non-UK owned category. For a
discussion of the potential consequences see Crone (1998). ownership is similar to a firm death (i.e., job destruction among UK-owned
firms) and a firm birth (i.e., job creation among non-UK owned firms.
Importantly, however, the number of jobs lost to the UK-owned sector in any
such transfer need not be the same as the number of jobs gained by the non-
UK owned sector due to firm expansion or contraction during the period in
which the transfer takes place. In the analysis we therefore treat firm
transfers between ownership groups separately essentially re-defining job
creation and destruction in the UK and non-UK owned sectors as:
JCtUK =  i SUK, ∆Ni>0(Nit – Nit–1) +  i EUKNit +  i SFUK Nit
JCtF =  i SF, ∆Ni>0(Nit – Nit–1) +  i EFNit +  i SUKF Nit
where  SUK and  SF are the UK and non-UK owned groups of surviving
companies and EUK and EF are groups of entrants to each ownership group.
SUKF is the group of firms transferring from UK to non-UK ownership and
SFUK is the group transferring in the opposite direction. The same groups of
companies are used in defining job destruction in the UK and non-UK owned
ownership groups:
JDtUK =  i SUK, ∆Ni<0|(Nit – Nit–1)| +  i XUKNit–1 +  i SUKF Nit–1
JDtF =  i SF, ∆Ni<0|(Nit – Nit–1)| +  i XFNit–1 +  i SFUK Nit–1
(b) Data Sources
To  undertake job creation and destruction analysis along the lines
suggested by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) necessitates longitudinal data at
individual plant or firm level. For the UK, the recently released ARD (Annual
Respondents Database) provides this type of information for the UK
production industries. The ARD database covers the period 1971-1997 and is
the consolidation of firms’ responses to the Annual Census of Production (now
called the Annual Business Inquiry). 
In GB until 1994, the ACOP was based on a register of firms maintained
by the Office of National Statistics (ONS). Post-1994 the ACOP was based on
the more comprehensive IDBR. In Northern Ireland the situation was
different with the ACOP register being maintained locally until 1994 and the
creation of the UK-wide IDBR. Other important differences also exist between
the ACOP in Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. First, the Northern
Ireland ACOP was run as a separate survey by the Department of Economic
Development (now the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment) in
188 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWBelfast. Firms’ responses were collected together in Belfast and information
then passed to ONS for inclusion in the UK summary statistics. Second, the
sampling structure used in the Northern Ireland ACOP differs significantly
from that adopted in GB. In GB, although there was some variation from year
to year, the typical pattern was for 100 per cent coverage for plants with 100
or more employees and a 1:4 sample of plants with 20-100 employees. Plants
on the register with employment less than 20 were ‘not selected’ for the ACOP.
In Northern Ireland the ACOP was comprehensive with all plants on the
register with more than 20 employees being ‘selected’ each year.4 This means
that for each Northern Ireland plant we have actual ARD data for each year,
while in the rest of the UK only register information – rather than survey
response data – is available for most plants in each year. This is clearly an
advantage for those plants included in the survey, but does little to overcome
the potential issues because of the exclusion of plants with fewer than 20
employees. In essence what this means is that in our analysis births relate to
plants’ first appearance in the ARD, i.e., when they reach 20 or more
employees; and deaths relate to plants which either close or whose
employment falls below the 20 employee cut off. 
Two approaches are possible to using the ARD database to calculate
estimates of job creation and destruction. First, like Barnes and Haskel (2000)
it is possible to use the entire group of ‘selected’ and ‘non-selected’ plants (i.e.
both those plants which did and did not provide data). This approach has the
advantage that it should include all plants, although this depends crucially on
the quality of the underlying register. Using all plants on the ARD database,
however, also has disadvantages because of the impact of register changes and
uncertainty about the sources and accuracy of the employment data for non-
selected plants. Using this approach also limits any analysis to the post-1981
period as prior to this no employment data is available for non-selected plants.
A second approach to calculating job creation and destruction estimates from
the ARD database is to use only selected plants. In GB this approach has
substantial disadvantages because of changes in the sampling structure for
smaller plants. For Northern Ireland, however, where selection is consistent
and universal this disadvantage is removed. Using this approach also avoids
any uncertainty over the accuracy of employment data for non-selected
businesses and allows estimates of job creation and destruction to be made for
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4 In part this was due to the publication each year of a separate Northern Ireland Census of
Production Summary Report, a publication which was produced until 1995. Only a proportion
(around a quarter) of the Northern Ireland ACOP responses were incorporated into the UK ACOP
summary report although information on all Northern Ireland ‘selected’ companies are included
in the ARD. the whole 1973-1993 period. In what follows we therefore base our analysis
solely on ‘selected’ plants, i.e. those which actually provided data as part of the
ACOP survey.5
Three other issues arise in using Northern Ireland ‘selected’ plants to
construct estimates of job creation and destruction. First, it is necessary to
consider the level of aggregation to be adopted. This primarily involves a
choice between an ‘establishment’ (or plant) based analysis or an ‘enterprise’
(or firm) based analysis. Ideally, one would work at the establishment level as
this is the most accurate representation of job creation and destruction.
Inspection of the Northern Ireland data, however, suggests marked and
numerically large inconsistencies between the way multi-plant firms reported
data for their various establishments. In some years a single ACOP return
might have been made covering a number of establishments. In other years
separate returns are made for each establishment. Moreover, where separate
returns are made for different establishments the split of activity within the
enterprise allocated to each establishment is often inconsistent through time.
The implication is that for multi-plant (or more accurately multi-
establishment) companies establishment level data will significantly over-
estimate job creation and destruction because of inconsistencies in reporting.
To  eliminate, or at least reduce, this problem we choose to base our 
estimates of job creation and destruction on ‘enterprise’ level data, 
aggregating appropriate establishments. Even this approach, however, still
resulted in major discontinuities in the employment time series generated.
These were primarily linked to situations where a number of enterprises 
were in common ownership or were parts of the same firm. Wherever 
possible these ‘multi-enterprise’ companies were identified and their data
consolidated. 
Basing our analysis on this consolidated enterprise data rather than
establishment level data reduces our overall estimates of job creation and
destruction for a number of reasons. First, as intended, the consolidation
eliminates a considerable amount of apparent job creation and destruction due
to inconsistencies in reporting by multi-establishment enterprises. Second,
consolidating inconsistent enterprise data within firms will also tend to reduce
the apparent level of job creation and destruction. Third, and less desirable, is
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5 We  limit our analysis, however, to the period prior to 1994, i.e. the period prior to the
introduction of the Inter Departmental Business Register (or IDBR). Over the 1993-1994 period,
coding changes in the move from the ACOP register to the IDBR register make it difficult to
identify reliable continuous time series for both establishments and enterprises. This leads to
discontinuities and a tendency to over-estimate the level of job creation and destruction. that the aggregation of establishments will mask offsetting job creation and
destruction within an enterprise.6
A second issue involved in using the ARD to estimate job creation and
destruction is that like all surveys the ACOP did not achieve 100 per cent
coverage in any given year. This results in some missing observations which,
if not addressed, would appear in the job creation and destruction analysis as
plant (i.e., establishment) deaths and entries whereas in fact the plants
continue to exist. No precise remedy exists for this problem so we adopt the
simplest possible procedure of linear interpolation to ‘fill-in’ gaps in
establishments’ employment time-series.7 This procedure will have no effect
on the overall level of job creation and destruction compared to an analysis run
on the ‘true’ data. It will, however, tend to smooth out or dampen year-on-year
variations in job creation and destruction although this effect will be relatively
small as the majority of the plants involved have relatively low employment
levels. 
A third issue relates to the construction of consistent SIC codes for
individual enterprises. In the ARD data, establishments with post-1994
observations have SIC92 codes derived from the IDBR. Establishments which
closed earlier than 1994 have either an SIC80 code or an SIC68 code. Where
an establishment had a SIC92 code this was used to classify the establishment
for its entire history. Where plants had no SIC92 codes in the ARD, previous
codes were translated to create SIC92 codes. Specifically, SIC68 codes were
translated to SIC80 codes using the Standard Industrial Classification
(Revised 1980) Reconciliation with SIC 1968, published by CSO, London, 1980.
SIC80 codes were then converted to SIC92 codes using the ‘Indices to the
Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 1992’, Government
Statistical Service, HMSO, 1993. Inevitably, some accuracy in classification is
lost in this type of procedure so we limit our sectoral analysis of job creation
and destruction to four broad manufacturing groups.8 The resulting dataset
includes a total of 719 enterprises in 1973 falling to 621 by 1993 with the
sectoral, sizeband and ownership breakdown of the number of enterprises in
the dataset given in Table A1. 
To illustrate the overall coverage of ‘selected’ enterprises in the ARD data
in Northern Ireland, Table 1 summarises total manufacturing employment
from the ARD and the Census of Employment (COE). Figure 1 presents the
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6 Estimates of job creation and destruction in Northern Ireland based on enterprise data are
available on request. 
7 The problem of missing observations applies primarily to small plants. These may either be non-
respondents in any given year or ‘non-selected’ cases because their indicative employment fell
below 20 for a short period. 
8 Where enterprises or consolidated enterprises contained establishments having different SIC92
codes the enterprise was categorised using that of the largest establishment. 192 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
same data in more graphic form. As Figure 1a suggests, the time series of total
ARD employment closely follows that of the Census of Employment with
broadly similar average growth rates over the 1973-1993 period (Table 1). The
difference between the two series is largely accounted for by the exclusion
from the ARD of establishments with less than 20 employees. Figure 1b gives
the percentage of total manufacturing employment in Northern Ireland (i.e.
COE employment) covered by the ARD. This declined from 1973 to 1983 over
the same period as total employment itself was falling, suggesting that the
decline in total manufacturing employment from the ARD actually fell faster
Table 1: Comparison of Northern Ireland Manufacturing Employment 
Figures: Census of Employment and the ARD
Census of  ARD Data ARD as 
Employment Data % of COE
000s % Change 000s % Change %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3)/(1)
1973 169.0 150.3 88.9
1974 170.0 0.6 149.7 –0.4 88.1
1975 159.0 –6.5 139.7 –6.7 87.9
1976 150.0 –5.7 131.0 –6.3 87.3
1977 145.0 –3.3 129.3 –1.3 89.2
1978 143.0 –1.4 125.0 –3.4 87.4
1979 146.0 2.1 118.7 –5.0 81.3
1980 136.0 –6.8 109.6 –7.6 80.6
1981 123.0 –9.6 97.3 –11.3 79.1
1982 112.0 –8.9 89.4 –8.1 79.9
1983 107.0 –4.5 86.4 –3.4 80.8
1984 107.0 0.0 87.5 1.3 81.8
1985 108.0 0.9 86.8 –0.8 80.4
1986 105.0 –2.8 83.5 –3.8 79.5
1987 103.0 –1.9 84.1 0.7 81.7
1988 106.0 2.9 85.1 1.1 80.2
1989 106.0 0.0 85.9 1.0 81.1
1990 106.0 0.0 85.3 –0.7 80.5
1991 102.0 –3.8 85.8 0.5 84.1
1992 102.0 0.0 84.1 –2.0 82.5
1993 99.0 –2.9 82.5 –0.8 83.3
Average –2.6 –2.9 83.1
Note: ARD figures are based on selected enterprises with interpolation for missing
values. See text for details.
Sources: NIARD database. Employees in employment; Employment Gazette Historical
Supplement, No. 3, 1992, Table 1.5, p.41; Northern Ireland Annual Abstract, 1995,
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Figure 1: Comparison of ARD and Census of Employment Time Series
(a) COE and ARD Employment Series
(b) ARD as a Percentage of COE Employment























%than the total number of manufacturing jobs in Northern Ireland. After 1983
as total manufacturing stabilised the proportion of employment covered by the
ARD increased marginally. In general terms, the extent of the coverage of the
ARD data (i.e. covering on average 83.1 per cent of manufacturing
employment), and the similarity of its time-series to that of total
manufacturing employment, suggests that the ARD data on selected
enterprises will provide a good guide to job creation and destruction in the
whole Northern Ireland manufacturing sector. 
III JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION 
Based on the consolidated enterprise data, Table 2 summarises job
creation and destruction in Northern Ireland manufacturing over the 1973-
1993 period. In total over this period the net decline in manufacturing
employment in Northern Ireland was 70,300. Underlying this net figure,
however, were much larger gross flows, i.e., much higher levels of job creation
and destruction. In total, 122,500 jobs were created over the 1973-1993 period
of which 37,300 (30.4 per cent) resulted from new enterprises being
established or new firm formation and 85,300 (69.6 per cent) were the result
of business expansions. Unfortunately, job destruction was larger, totalling
192,900 over the 1973-1993 period. Again this can be broken down into 73,200
(37.9 per cent) job losses in business closures and 119,700 (62.0 per cent) in
contractions (Table 2). 
Another way of looking at this data is to take annual averages of the net
and gross flows and examine how these vary through time. Table 2 gives
period averages defined to reflect the phases of the UK business cycle. Over
the whole 1973-1993 period, manufacturing employment in Northern Ireland
fell by an average of 3,300 per annum although, as Figure 1(a) suggested, this
fall in employment was largely concentrated in the pre-1983 period (Figure 2).
During the oil crisis downturn of 1973-1975 job destruction exceeded job
creation by 4,400 per annum with job destruction dominated by contraction as
Northern Ireland manufacturing firms sharply reduced the scale of their
operations in response to difficult operating conditions. A similar pattern
continued through the brief UK recovery of 1976-1978 with continuing net job
losses (Table 2). During the sharp UK downturn of 1979-1980, particularly
high rates of net job losses were recorded as job creation fell sharply and job
destruction continued at around the same level as the previous decade. In
contrast to the 1973-75 downturn, however, job destruction during 1979-80
was increased by high levels of closure, particularly among man-made fibres
companies strongly oriented towards export markets (Harrison, 1990).
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Table 2: Job Creation and Destruction in Northern Ireland Manufacturing: 
Gross Flows 
Employment Total Total Job Creation Job Destruction
Levels Change Job Job Entry Expan- Death Contrac-
Creation Destruc- sion tion
tion
000s 000s 000s 000s 000s 000s 000s 000s
1973-1993 Total –1070.3 122.5 192.9 37.3 85.3 73.2 119.7
1973-75 Average –104.4 6.8 11.2 1.6 5.2 3.2 8.0
1976-78 Average –104.9 6.4 11.3 1.4 5.0 4.5 6.8
1979-80 Average –107.7 3.8 11.4 0.8 3.0 5.0 6.5
1981-88 Average –103.1 5.5 8.6 1.9 3.6 3.5 5.1
1989-91 Average 0.2 7.0 6.7 2.5 4.5 2.6 4.1
1992-93 Average –101.6 5.2 6.9 1.9 3.3 2.3 4.6
1973 150.3 –102.5 7.8 10.3 1.5 6.3 3.7 6.6
1974 149.7 –100.6 7.7 8.3 2.2 5.4 2.1 6.1
1975 139.7 –1010.0 5.0 15.0 1.1 3.9 3.8 11.3
1976 131.0 –108.7 7.0 15.7 1.7 5.3 6.9 8.8
1977 129.3 –101.7 7.4 9.1 1.9 5.6 3.7 5.4
1978 125.0 –104.3 4.8 9.2 0.6 4.2 3.0 6.1
1979 118.7 –106.3 3.9 10.1 0.1 3.8 4.6 5.5
1980 109.6 –109.1 3.6 12.7 1.4 2.2 5.3 7.4
1981 97.3 –1012.4 2.9 15.3 0.7 2.2 6.7 8.6
1982 89.4 –107.8 5.1 12.9 3.4 1.7 6.2 6.7
1983 86.4 –103.0 4.9 7.9 1.8 3.1 2.5 5.4
1984 87.5 1.1 6.5 5.4 2.6 4.0 1.8 3.6
1985 86.8 –100.7 6.3 7.0 1.6 4.7 3.4 3.6
1986 83.5 –103.3 4.3 7.6 1.7 2.6 2.1 5.5
1987 84.1 0.6 7.1 6.5 2.4 4.8 2.4 4.1
1988 85.1 0.9 6.8 5.9 1.4 5.4 2.6 3.2
1989 85.9 0.9 7.4 6.5 3.1 4.3 2.4 4.1
1990 85.3 –100.6 6.2 6.8 1.4 4.8 2.6 3.2
1991 85.8 0.5 7.3 6.9 2.8 4.5 2.7 4.1
1992 84.1 –101.7 5.3 7.0 2.3 3.0 2.3 4.6
1993 82.5 –101.6 5.1 6.8 1.5 3.6 2.3 4.5
Note: Figures are based on selected enterprises with interpolation for missing
observations. See text for details of data sources and derivation. 
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The UK recovery of the early-1980s, and the subsequent upturn until
1988, brought job destruction and job creation in Northern Ireland closer into
balance with a recovery in annual job creation and a fall in job destruction. In
1984, 1987 and 1988 in particular, job creation actually exceeded job
destruction leading to a positive net change in total manufacturing
employment (Table 2). This positive net trend continued into 1989, despite the
downturn in the wider UK economy. The UK upturn of 1992-93 was less
felicitous with a return to net job losses in Northern Ireland manufacturing
although these averaged only a third of those during the early and mid-1970s
(Figure 2). 
A consistent feature of job creation and destruction in Northern Ireland is
the balance between entry and expansion and death and contraction. Overall,
since 1973, nearly two and a half times as many jobs have been created in firm
expansions than in new inward investments and new firm formation. In terms
of job losses, a similar picture emerges with contractions significantly more
important than firm closures as a source of job destruction. 
In sectoral terms the pattern of job creation and destruction is predictable
with relatively high levels of job losses in firm deaths in the textile and
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Notes & Sources: See Table 2.
Job Destruction
000s
Job Creationclothing sectors and significant job losses in firm contractions in engineering.
Table 3 summarises the basic figures for four industrial groupings9: 
• In the food and drink sector (SIC92 15, 16), total employment declined
by 7,700 over the 1973-1993 period, the result of job creation of 25,800
and job destruction of 33,300. From 1991-1993 something of a reversal
of the historical pattern was evident with net job gains due largely to
job creation by existing firms.
• In the textile and clothing (SIC 17-19) sectors total employment
declined 29,800 over the 1973-1993 period, with total job creation of
37,700 and total job destruction of 67,600. High levels of job destruction
throughout the period reflect relatively high levels of firm closure with
much smaller numbers of jobs created in firm entry. 
• In engineering (SIC92 27-35), total employment declined by 21,600 over
the 1973-1993 period, the result of job creation of 32,400 and job
destruction of 54,000. Among engineering firms, contraction was a
particularly important source of job destruction, particularly associated
with falling employment in heavy engineering, shipbuilding and textile
machinery. 
• In the broadly defined other manufacturing sector (SIC92 20-26, 36,
37), employment losses of 11,200 over the 1973-1993 period were the
balance of job creation of 26,600 and job destruction of 37,800. 
In general terms, our estimates of the relative size of the net and gross
flows for Northern Ireland accord with those of other UK studies of job
creation and destruction. Important differences exist, however, between the
sources of job creation and destruction in Northern Ireland and the UK.
Barnes and Haskel (2000) estimates for example, suggest that entry accounted
for 51.2 per cent of job creation in the UK compared to 30.4 per cent in
Northern Ireland. Similarly, they estimate that closure accounted for 49.7 per
cent of UK job destruction compared to 37.9 per cent in Northern Ireland. In
other words, job turnover in Northern Ireland was more strongly associated
with contraction and expansion (and less strongly associated with firm entry
and closure) than that in the UK as a whole. This may, in part, reflect the very
different sectoral composition of Northern Ireland and UK manufacturing. It
may also reflect the socio-political situation of Northern Ireland and the
effects of the region’s intensive industrial policy regime (e.g., Harris, 1991). In
particular, the troubles are likely to have reduced large-scale inward
investments into Northern Ireland despite the efforts of the Industrial
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Development Board to promote Northern Ireland as an industrial location (see
Fielding, 2003). There may also have been a negative impact on locally-owned
start-ups of smaller firms although as we shall see later this effect is less clear.
Other aspects of the industrial development regime in Northern Ireland may
also have had a significant impact on maintaining manufacturing employment
in Northern Ireland by reducing the number of firm closures. Levels of capital
and other grant support in the region have been high by EU standards, with
evidence that Northern Ireland firms have had significantly stronger balance
sheets than firms elsewhere in the UK and may therefore have been more
resilient in economic downturns (Roper, 1996). 
IV JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION RATES AND 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
To  make international comparisons of job creation and destruction we
need to define job creation and destruction rates, and for Northern Ireland
these are given in Table 4 and Figure 3. As we would expect from the earlier
analysis, the job destruction rate in Northern Ireland exceeds the job creation
rate until around 1983 since when the rates have been broadly similar. This is
Figure 3: Net and Gross Job Flows in Northern Ireland Manufacturing: 
1973-1993
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reflected in a net employment growth rate close to zero (Figure 3). Perhaps
more interesting, however, is the job reallocation rate which gives an
indication of the overall level of job turnover in the labour market: the higher
the job reallocation rate the greater the average level of turnover and the
shorter average job duration. Although the job reallocation rate peaked in
1982, its average level since the early-1980s has been markedly higher than
that during the 1970s. The implication is that over this period average job
duration in Northern Ireland declined, the result of a relatively high job
creation rate coupled with a high job destruction rate (Table 4, Figure 3). 
Comparing job creation and job destruction rates between areas is difficult
due to differences in data sources, the construction of the estimates
themselves and the time periods considered. Table 5 compares our estimates
of job creation and destruction rates in Northern Ireland to those calculated
for Ireland, Norway, Denmark and the UK. Our choice of comparators was
guided by Strobl et al. (1998) who suggest the similarity between the
Norwegian and Danish estimates, their own analysis and the Northern
Ireland data, with each covering almost all manufacturing firms. We also
include estimates from Barnes and Haskel (2000) for 1980-1991 based on
selected and non-selected establishments from the ARD, the same base data
as that used for Northern Ireland. 
The international comparisons suggest two main points. First, job creation
rates in Northern Ireland are generally below those in other areas in the
majority of years. Compared to Ireland in particular, job creation rates were
lower in Northern Ireland in all but three years – 1984, 1987 and 1991 (Table
5). Similarly, job creation rates in Northern Ireland were below those in
Norway in all but three years (out of sixteen) and were consistently below
those estimated for Denmark (Table 5). Job creation rates in Northern Ireland
were also lower than those estimated by Barnes and Haskel (2000) for the UK
as a whole, although this may reflect both real factors and the difference
between their establishment-based and the enterprise-based estimates for
Northern Ireland. Second, job destruction rates in Northern Ireland also tend
to be below those in other areas, although the differential is not as consistent
as that for job creation rates. Compared to Ireland, for example, the job
destruction rate in Northern Ireland was lower in 12 (out of 20 years), with a
marked contrast particularly during the late-1970s. Job destruction rates in
Northern Ireland also tended to be lower in the majority of years than in
Norway and Denmark, and in all but one year (1981) were lower than those
estimated by Barnes and Haskel (2000). Taken together, these comparisons
suggest that the rate of job reallocation in Northern Ireland has been
relatively low compared to that in other areas, with the main difference
occurring in terms of job creation rather than job destruction rates. AsJOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND: 1973-1993 201
Table 4: Job Creation and Destruction Rates for Northern Ireland 
Manufacturing
Job Creation  Job Net  Gross Job Excess Job
Rate Destruction Employment Reallocation Reallocation
Rate Growth Rate Rate Rate
%%% %%
Period Averages
1973-75 4.4 7.3 –102.9 11.7 8.8
1976-78 4.8 8.4 –103.6 13.2 9.5
1979-80 3.2 9.7 –106.5 12.9 6.4
1981-88 6.3 9.6 –103.2 15.9 11.9
1989-91 7.7 7.6 0.1 15.3 14.7
1992-93 6.0 8.0 –101.9 14.0 12.1
1973 4.9 6.5 –101.6 11.5 9.8
1974 4.9 5.3 –100.4 10.2 9.8
1975 3.4 10.1 –106.7 13.5 6.8
1976 5.0 11.3 –106.3 16.2 10.0
1977 5.6 6.8 –101.2 12.4 11.1
1978 3.8 7.1 –103.4 10.9 7.5
1979 3.2 8.3 –105.1 11.5 6.4
1980 3.2 11.2 –108.0 14.3 6.4
1981 2.9 14.9 –1012.0 17.8 5.7
1982 5.6 14.2 –108.6 19.8 11.2
1983 5.8 9.4 –103.6 15.2 11.6
1984 7.7 6.4 1.3 14.1 12.8
1985 7.3 8.2 –100.9 15.5 14.6
1986 5.1 9.0 –103.9 14.1 10.2
1987 8.5 7.7 0.7 16.2 15.5
1988 7.9 6.8 1.1 14.8 13.7
1989 8.5 7.5 1.0 16.1 15.1
1990 7.2 7.3 –100.1 14.5 14.3
1991 8.4 7.9 0.5 16.4 15.8
1992 6.1 8.1 –101.9 14.2 12.3
1993 6.0 7.9 –101.9 13.8 11.9
Corr 0.802 –100.894 –10 –100.301 0.781
Note: Figures are based on selected enterprises. See text for details of data sources
and derivation. Corr. is the correlation between the different rates and the net
employment growth rate. 
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indicated in Section III, this may be explained by a combination of socio-
economic factors and Northern Ireland’s intensive industrial policy regime. 
Apart from the overall level of job turnover, two other aspects of job
turnover have been widely discussed in the literature: the cyclicality of job
turnover and its persistence. In terms of cyclicality, the standard approach is
to consider correlations between job creation and destruction rates and the net
employment growth rate, and figures for Northern Ireland are given in Table
4. These suggest results very similar to those of other international studies
(see for example, Strobl et al. (1998), Table 3). For Ireland, for example, Strobl
et al. (1998), find that the job destruction rate moves counter-cyclically
(correlation coefficient, –0.96) while the job creation rate moves pro-cyclically
(correlation coefficient, 0.87). In Northern Ireland, the same correlation
coefficients are: job destruction rate, –0.89; job creation rate, 0.80. In other
words the same pattern of counter-cyclical job destruction and pro-cyclical job
creation is evident in both Northern Ireland and Ireland. Moreover, in both
areas – as suggested by the size of the correlation coefficient – the job
destruction rate is more cyclically responsive than the job creation rate (see
also Strobl et al. (1998), p. 60). More generally, however, job reallocation,
although counter-cyclical in both Northern Ireland (correlation coefficient,
–0.30) and Ireland (correlation coefficient, –0.61), is less cyclically responsive
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in Northern Ireland than in Ireland. As before this may reflect the ‘damping’
effect of Northern Ireland’s industrial policy regime and the troubles on
cyclical variations in both job creation and job destruction. 
Persistence in job creation and destruction is relatively simply captured by
the proportion of job turnover which persists one and two years after it occurs
(see for example, Broersma and Gautier, 1997, p. 213). Like Strobl et al.
(1998), we find lower persistence among jobs created in Northern Ireland than
among those destroyed (Table 5); around 76 per cent of jobs created persist
beyond the first year compared to 92 per cent of jobs destroyed (Table 6).
Notably, however, persistence rates in Northern Ireland are generally higher
than those in Ireland. This is primarily a consequence of the lower rates of job
turnover noted earlier, and may also reflect the contribution of Northern
Ireland’s policy regime in maintaining employment stability. 
Table 5: Job Creation and Destruction Rates: International Comparisons
Job Creation Rates Job Destruction Rates
1973 4.9 6.5
1974 4.9 7.5 5.3 7.1
1975 3.4 6.6 10.1 10.2
1976 5 9.6 11.3 7.7
1977 5.6 9.8 7.5 6.8 7.7 6.8
1978 3.8 9.1 7.6 7.1 5.9 8.9
1979 3.2 10.1 7.2 8.3 6.1 8.5
1980 3.2 7.8 6.8 5.3 11.2 10.7 7 18.2
1981 2.9 8.2 6.6 11.6 6.4 14.9 9.7 8.1 13.4 14.6
1982 5.6 7 5.2 11.4 7.8 14.2 10 8.1 10.8 13.2
1983 5.8 7.9 6.2 11.6 17.4 9.4 12.5 12.6 11.4 18.3
1984 7.7 7.4 7.5 15.4 16.1 6.4 11.1 8.5 8.8 18.4
1985 7.3 7.7 8.6 14.5 11.5 8.2 10.7 7.9 9.2 13.6
1986 5.1 7.8 9.6 12 14.3 9 9.9 8.6 11.2 14.5
1987 8.5 7.5 7.5 10.5 14.6 7.7 11 7.9 12.7 13.8
1988 7.9 9 7.8 10.9 14.8 6.8 7.9 13.8 12.6 13.9
1989 8.5 10 6.8 11.9 12.5 7.5 7.4 14.4 10.8 14.8
1990 7.2 8.9 8.6 11.6 10.5 7.3 8.2 10.9 12 16.9
1991 8.4 7.9 8.1 10.4 7.9 8.3 10.3
1992 6.1 7.7 7.7 8.1 8 10.8
1993 6 8.5 7.9 9.8
Sources: Ireland, Strobl et al. (1998); Norway, Salvanes (1995); Denmark, Albaek and










































































KV FIRM SIZE ANALYSIS 
Since the Bolton Report of 1971 and particularly since the publication of
the paper by Birch (1981) emphasising the role of small companies in job
generation in the US, considerable attention has been paid to the role of small
firms in job creation (see the discussion in Storey (1994), pp. 112-158 and
Barnes and Haskel (2000)). In Northern Ireland too, particular attention has
been paid to the role of small firms in job generation (Hart, 1989; Gudgin et
al., 1995; Hart and Hanvey, 1995) and the potential effects of small business
support (Hanvey et al., 1994 and 1994a; Hart and Scott, 1994; Cromie and
Birley, 1994; Birley and Bridge, 1997; Hart and Gudgin, 1999; Roper and
Hewitt-Dundas, 2001).10
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Table 6: Job Persistence Indicators for Northern Ireland
Job Creation  Job Destruction 
Remaining After: Remaining After:
One Year Two Years One Year Two Years
1974 0.62 0.50 0.87 0.84
1975 0.72 0.68 0.89 0.87
1976 0.77 0.64 0.94 0.94
1977 0.69 0.59 0.87 0.88
1978 0.75 0.61 0.95 0.96
1979 0.65 0.44 0.97 0.97
1980 0.63 0.57 0.96 0.96
1981 0.78 0.59 0.98 0.96
1982 0.82 0.81 0.95 0.96
1983 0.86 0.77 0.91 0.87
1984 0.82 0.76 0.86 0.88
1985 0.67 0.62 0.93 0.91
1986 0.84 0.77 0.92 0.81
1987 0.76 0.72 0.92 0.91
1988 0.81 0.71 0.88 0.87
1989 0.81 0.68 0.92 0.89
1990 0.83 0.74 0.93 0.92
1991 0.78 0.70 0.94 0.91
1992 0.79 0.91
Average 0.76 0.66 0.92 0.91
Note: Figures are based on selected enterprises. See text for details of derivation. 
Source: NIARD database. 
10Other studies have considered other aspects of small business development in Northern Ireland,
e.g.  benchmarking performance of small firms in Northern Ireland against other regions (e.g.,
Birley et al., 1994; McFerran et al., 1996; Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 1998). Other aspects of small
business growth and development including the determinants of small firm growth (e.g. Barkham
et al., 1996; Roper 1998, 1999; Roper et al., 1997; McKillop and Barton, 1995) and the capability
(Kinsella et al., 1994) and labour market impact (Hart, 1993) of small firms. Typically, these comparisons have identified a substantial differential in
employment growth rates between small and larger firms and between
assisted and non-assisted small businesses.11 The majority of the studies
focus, however, on a relatively short time period and have often been based on
survey or sample data. The advantages of the ARD data in this respect are
that it covers the whole time-period since 1973 and provides true longitudinal
information on all manufacturing firms in Northern Ireland with more than
20 employees. This enables us to estimate job creation and destruction for
firms grouped by size, and to estimate the contribution of each firm sizeband
to both gross and net job creation. 
Since 2002, responsibility for all aspects of industrial development in
Northern Ireland has been consolidated into Invest Northern Ireland. Over
the period covered by our analysis here, however, responsibility was split
between the Local Enterprise Development Unit (LEDU) which focused on
firms with less than 50 employees and the Industrial Development Board or
IDB which supported larger businesses and inward investment (e.g., Harris,
1991). This split is important not only because of the fundamental differences
between small and larger firms but also because the type of support offered by
the two agencies has differed. In the job creation and destruction analysis we
reflect this by identifying three size categories of firm; those with less than 50
employees (predominantly LEDU client companies), and those with 50-249
employees and 250 or more employees (both groups dominated by IDB client
companies). 
Unfortunately, estimating job creation and destruction by enterprise size
involves a technicality which turns out to have a significant impact on the
results. More specifically, to generate job creation and destruction by sizeband
we have to classify each enterprise to a specific size-group. Two main
alternatives have been used classifying firms either by their initial
employment or by their average employment. Because the results differ
somewhat we summarise both possibilities in Table 7.
As the previous tables suggested, during the 1974-1993 period the total
net fall in manufacturing employment in Northern Ireland was 66,600 (Table
7). Estimates based on initial and average firm size suggest slightly different
decompositions of this net change between small, medium and large
enterprises. Using both methods, however, the group of small firms (with 20-
49 employees) was the only size group to show a net increase in employment
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11 For example, from 1989-1993 net employment growth of 31.6 per cent in assisted small firms in
the Republic of Ireland compared to a fall of 10.4 per cent in non-assisted companies. In Northern
Ireland, over the same period, employment in assisted small firms grew 29.3 per cent but rose only
0.5 per cent in non-assisted firms (Buckland, 1996, Table 4, p. 20).over the 1974-1993 period of 1,100-6,900. Larger firms in both the 50-249 and
250 employee plus sizebands experienced net losses of employment of 67,600-
73,500 depending on the calculation method used. The source of these changes
can easily be seen by looking at the shares of small and larger firms in job
creation and destruction (Table 7). Based on firms’ initial employment, for
example, small firms accounted for 23.3 per cent of job creation over the 1973-
1993 period, but only 10.8 per cent of job destruction. Larger firms, however,
tended to experience more job losses than job gains perhaps reflecting the
difficulties noted earlier in terms of attracting inward investment to Northern
Ireland. 
Figure 5 illustrates the pattern of job creation and destruction among
small and larger firms from 1973-1993, with both charts being based on firms’
initial size. Marked differences are evident between the time paths of job
creation and destruction for the two firm sizebands. Smaller firms seem to
have been relatively immune to the impact of the downturns of the mid-1970s
and 1979-1980 and to have had a strong job creation performance since the
early-1980s (Figure 5a). Jobs in larger firms, however, proved more vulnerable
to downturns in the UK economy during the 1970s and early 1980s. Since
then, however, job creation among this group of firms has broadly matched job
destruction. 
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Table 7: Job Creation and Destruction in Northern Ireland by Sizeband: 1974-
1993
Sizeband Job Creation Job Destruction Net
Change
000s % 000 % 000s
A. Initial Employment Estimates
20-49 employees 26.7 23.3 19.7 10.8 7.0
50-249 employees 44.9 39.2 56.4 30.9 –11.4
250 plus employees 43.1 37.6 106.5 58.3 –63.4
Total 114.8 100.0 182.6 100.0 –67.8
B. Average Employment Estimates
20-49 employees 19.0 16.6 17.7 9.7 1.3
50-249 employees 49.1 42.8 65.8 36.0 –16.6
250 plus employees 46.6 40.6 99.0 54.2 –52.4
Total 114.8 100.0 182.5 100.0 –67.7
Note: Figures are based on selected enterprises. See text for details of data sources and
derivation. 
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Figure 5: Job Creation and Destruction by Small and Larger Firms
(a) Small Firms (20-49 employees)
(b) Larger Firms (50 plus employees)
Notes & Sources: See Table 7.The implication, and one which is consistent with the results of other
studies using very different approaches (e.g. Gudgin et al., 1995, Roper and
Hewitt-Dundas, 2001) is that the small firm sector in Northern Ireland has
outperformed larger firms at least in terms of net job creation. One important
factor in this performance has undoubtedly been the role of government
assistance for small firms. Roper and Hewitt-Dundas (2001), for example, use
an econometric approach to identify the ‘selection’ and ‘assistance’ effects of
small business support in Northern Ireland. They demonstrate that from
1991-1995 government assistance to small firms in Northern Ireland had a
significant and positive effect on employment growth.12 More widely, our
results contrast with some of the findings of DHS, for example, on the
contrasting performance of smaller and larger manufacturing firms. In
particular – in contrast to the ‘small business job creation myth’ (p. 58), DHS
find that smaller manufacturing firms have lower net job creation rates than
larger businesses. This is not true of our data. Indeed, for our data it is only
small firms – i.e., those with less than 50 employees which actually have a
record of positive net job creation over the 1973-1993 period (Table 7). More
consistent with the general point being made by DHS, however, that small
firm job growth has not been as important as some (e.g. Birch, 1981) have
argued, is that in Northern Ireland the net (positive) change in employment in
small firms has been only around one-tenth of the net (negative) job change in
larger businesses. 
VI JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION – BY FIRM OWNERSHIP13
Inward investment has also played an important role in the industrial
development strategy of Northern Ireland throughout the post-war period
(see, for example, Teague, 1987; Harris, 1991, pp. 106-138; NIEC, 1992;
Hamilton, 1993).14 Harrison (1990), for example, comments that 
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12 Less satisfactory, however, was Roper and Hewitt-Dundas’s finding that government assistance
had no effect on increasing small firms’ sales growth or profitability. The implication being that
although assistance was increasing employment growth in small firms it was actually reducing
the rate of productivity growth.
13 This section draws heavily on Crone (1998).
14 The legislative basis for the promotion and assistance of inward investment can be traced back
to the New Industries Development Act 1932. Harrison (1990) highlights three later sets of
legislation: the Industrial Development (Northern Ireland) Act 1945 established the basis for
selective financial assistance for employment creation; the second, legislation in the 1950s that
enabled government to grant-aid existing firms to re-equip and modernise, with no employment
test; and third, a significant addition to ID policy in 1971 when previous acts were extended to
allow the provision of financial assistance for the maintenance or ‘safeguarding’ of existing
employment. …  the attraction of mobile British investment and new foreign direct
investment to a region such as Northern Ireland would provide a necessary
broadening of the industrial base of the regional economy and offer the
prospect of stable or expanding employment opportunities in
manufacturing industry. (p. 87)
Aside from its obvious benefits in terms of job creation, inward investment
also has other potential advantages. Young, Hood and Hamill (1988), for
example, observe that the establishment of an MNE firm on a greenfield site
necessarily involves the physical relocation of technologies embodied in capital
goods (e.g. machinery) and a number of forms of disembodied technology,
including industrial property rights, unpatented know-how, and managerial
and organisational expertise. They also suggest, however, that an MNE firm
may contribute to local technological development: by undertaking local
research and development, through supply-chain linkages or supplier
development activities, and through a “demonstration effect” on local firms.
Each effect is likely to have positive spill-overs for the economic development
of the region which will not be reflected in the employment of the externally-
owned sector. Job creation or destruction analysis, reflecting changes in the
employment of the externally-owned sector, will capture the direct job creation
benefits of inward investment. It cannot, however, reflect the more dynamic
spill-over benefits derived by locally-owned firms from inward investment and
is therefore likely to under-estimate the true benefits of past inward
investment.15
Afurther limitation to our job creation and destruction analysis is that the
ARD data do not discriminate between Northern Ireland and GB-owned firms.
We  are essentially limited therefore to a UK-owned, non-UK owned
comparison, a distinction which while useful fails to reflect changes in firm
ownership within the UK. In particular, this distinction fails to reflect the
take-over or purchase of Northern Ireland owned businesses by firms from
other UK regions. As suggested in Section II, we are able, however, to identify
separately firms moving between UK and non-UK ownership which itself
raises other issues. As indicated in Section II, firms changing ownership may
in the same period either create or destroy jobs. This suggests two possible
approaches; we could exclude firms transferring ownership from the analysis,
which preserves transparency but excludes job creation or destruction taking
JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND: 1973-1993 209
15 More sophisticated approaches are necessary to measure these spill-over effects which may
influence the employment, sales or productivity growth of indigenously-owned firms. One recent
example is Aitken and Harrison (1999) who use panel data estimation techniques to estimate the
impact of externally–owned firms in Venezuela on the total factor productivity of indigenously-
owned firms.place in those firms changing ownership status; alternatively, we could include
firms transferring ownership in the job creation and destruction analysis,
recognising that both estimates will include transfers from the other
ownership group. We adopt the second approach in what follows, preferring
not to exclude firms from the analysis and so preserve as much comparability
as possible with the aggregate analysis. 
Table 8 summarises the overall record of job creation and destruction of
UK and non-UK owned manufacturing firms from 1976, when the data on firm
ownership begins, through to 1993. Net job losses are evident in both
ownership groups with these job losses broadly reflecting the underlying
composition of manufacturing ownership in Northern Ireland (Figure 5).16
Perhaps more striking, however, are differences in the composition of job
creation and destruction for each ownership group. For UK-owned businesses
entry and expansion were more important forms of job creation than for non-
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Table 8: Job Creation and Destruction in Northern Ireland Manufacturing by
Ownership: 1976-93
Employment Job Creation Job Destruction
000s Change Job Job Entry Expan- Owner- Death Con- Owner-
(end Crea- Destruc- sion ship traction ship
year) tion tion Change Change
Part A: UK Owned Businesses
1976-78 80.0 –3.9 6.2 10.1 1.4 4.1 0.7 4.3 5.2 0.5
1979-80 71.0 –6.6 3 9.6 0.5 2.3 0.1 3.7 5.6 0.2
1981-88 48.3 –1.3 5.8 7 1.7 3 1 2.4 3.8 0.8
1989-91 47.6 –3.5 5.7 9.2 2 3.4 0.3 2.3 3.4 3.4
1992-93 43.3 –1 5.1 6.1 1.9 2.9 0.3 2.2 3.4 0.6
Total –56.4 102.4 159 29.6 61 12 55.1 84.3 19.8
Part B: Non-UK Owned Businesses
1976-78 28.4 –1 1.5 2.4 0 0.9 0.5 0.2 1.6 0.6
1979-80 26.4 –1 1.2 2.2 0.3 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.9 0.2
1981-88 11.8 –1.8 1.5 3.3 0.2 0.5 0.8 1 1.3 0.7
1989-91 23.1 3.8 5.1 1.2 0.4 1.1 3.4 0.2 0.7 3.6
1992-93 21.9 –0.6 0.9 1.6 0 0.4 0.6 0.1 1.2 0.5
Total –10.7 0 36.4 46.9 3.8 12.5 20.2 12.3 22.4 11.8
Note: Figures are based on selected enterprises. See text for details of data sources and
derivation. 
Source: NIARD database 
16 Importantly, the job losses of non-UK owned firms would also have been substantially greater
had it not been for the privatisation of Shorts Brothers and Harland and Wolff in 1989, both of
which were purchased by non-UK companies (Table 7).UK owned firms, while for non-UK based businesses, ownership transfers
(primarily takeovers) accounted for 55.4 per cent of job creation. For UK-
owned businesses such transfers were relatively small accounting for 11.7 per
cent of job creation and 12.4 per cent of job destruction over the 1976-1993
period. Transfers were also a more important source of job destruction among
non-UK owned businesses than among UK-owned businesses, accounting for
25.1 per cent of jobs lost.17
Aside from the aggregate differences in the composition of job creation and
destruction for UK and non-UK businesses, significant differences also exist
between sub-periods in the sample. From 1975-1979, for example, ownership
transfers between the UK and non-UK groups were small in scale, and there
was a high level of job losses in UK-owned firms through both closure and
contraction and a much lower level of job creation. This is a marked contrast
with the non-UK owned sector which, although it experienced a high closure
rate during the 1973-1974 recession (Harrison, 1990, p. 102), had stabilised by
1978-1979. NIEC (1983, cited in Harrison, 1990, p. 102) highlight two factors
in the high level of closures – particularly among UK-owned firms – in the post
1975-1979 period. First, it was claimed that it is natural for employment in
any project to build up to a peak then fall away over time. The presence of
large numbers of firms first established in Northern Ireland in the 1950s and
1960s meant that many of these firms were susceptible to rationalisation or
closure in the 1970s. The vintage of firms may also explain the higher closure
rate among UK-owned firms in the late 1970s as these firms were generally
established earlier than non-UK owned firms. Second, adverse economic
conditions following the 1973-1974 recession brought forward the incidence of
rationalisations or closures that might have occurred anyway in subsequent
years. It is notable that NIEC did not include the ‘troubles’ as a significant
factor in these firm closures.18
Post-1979, the overvaluation of Sterling coincides with a period of rapid
structural change with an increase in job destruction (and a fall in job
creation) among both UK and non-UK owned firms (Figure 6). Non-UK owned
firms, however, proved much more susceptible to closure during the 1979-1982
recession than during the 1974-79 period. Notable among the firms lost during
this period were a group of firms in the man-made fibres sector. This sector
suffered an almost total collapse in Northern Ireland between 1979 and 1982
as a total employment loss of 8,600 jobs in this sector accounted for 61 per cent
of all jobs lost in assisted firms between 1979 and 1982 and left only 1,350 jobs
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17 Detailed information on these calculations is available from the author. 
18 Fothergill and Guy (1990) also rejected the assertion that the ‘troubles’ were a cause of closures
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Figure 6: Job Creation and Destruction in UK and Non-UK Owned Firms
(a)  UK Owned Firms
(b) Non-UK Owned Firms



















1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993




Job Destructionby June 1982 (Harrison, 1990, p. 106-7). As suggested earlier, the period from
1981-1988, dominated by the Lawson boom in the UK, was marked by lower
levels of volatility in employment in both the UK and non-UK owned sectors
with lower, and more balanced, levels of job creation and destruction. It is over
this period, however, that transfers of ownership between the UK and non-UK
categories become more significant reflecting the general increase in
acquisition and merger activity in Europe during the 1980s. 
VII CONCLUSIONS
From 1973-1993 manufacturing employment in Northern Ireland fell
70,300, the result of job creation of 122,500 and job destruction of 192,900. Of
the jobs created, 37,300 (30.4 per cent) resulted from new enterprises being
established or new firm formation, and 85,300 (69.6 per cent) were the result
of business expansions. Job destruction was more strongly influenced by
business closure, which accounted for 73,200 (37.9 per cent) of job losses,
compared to 119,700 (62.0 per cent) lost in contractions. Compared to the
analysis of Barnes and Haskel (2000) for the UK as a whole, firm contraction
and expansion were more important sources of job creation and destruction in
Northern Ireland than in the UK, with closure and entry less important. One
clear possibility is that the Troubles and the support offered by the Industrial
Development Board to companies in Northern Ireland over this period were
reducing levels of investment and closure relative to that elsewhere. 
In terms of the sources of job creation and destruction in Northern Ireland,
small firms (i.e. those with less than 50 employees) were the only group to
experience net job growth over the 1973-1993 period, although this was
relatively small in absolute terms. Both UK and non-UK owned businesses
experienced significant job losses over the period. A significant transfer of
employment is also evident between the two ownership categories,
particularly from UK owned to non-UK owned businesses. 
Comparison to non-UK studies suggests that job creation and destruction
rates in Northern Ireland were generally below those observed elsewhere.
They exhibit many of the commonly observed properties, however: job
destruction in Northern Ireland is counter-cyclical, while job creation is pro-
cyclical; as in Ireland, the job destruction rate is more cyclically responsive
than the job creation rate; and, job persistence is greater in Northern Ireland
than in Ireland. 
Although informative our job creation and destruction analysis has some
important limitations. First, the current configuration of the Northern Ireland
ARD database does not enable us to distinguish between Northern Ireland
JOB CREATION AND DESTRUCTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND: 1973-1993 213and GB-owned firms. This limits the insights which can be gained from any
analysis by ownership as it means we cannot identify Northern Ireland firms
taken-over by other UK companies. Second, the current analysis tells us
nothing about either job quality or the contribution of jobs to wealth creation.
Jobs in small manufacturing firms, for example, may be welcome but tend to
be lower paid and generate lower productivity than those in larger firms.
Third, the current aggregate analysis tells us little about the equity angle
either in terms of the distribution of jobs between males and females,
communities or geographical locations. Fourth, because of difficulties in
matching time series for individual businesses the current analysis is limited
to the 1973 to 1993 period, i.e. the period prior to the introduction of the Inter-
departmental Business Register in 1994. Future analysis might exploit other
aspects of the ARD database to address these questions and extend the
analysis to the post-1993 period. It would also be of considerable interest to
explore the dynamics of job change in Northern Ireland in more detail. In
other words, to consider whether employment adjustments were concentrated
in a few companies, or whether employment adjustments were evenly
distributed across the population of firms.19
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19 I am grateful to a referee for suggesting this as a possible direction for future research. ANNEX: DATA STRUCTURE
Table A1 summarises the number of enterprises with non-zero employment
in the Northern Ireland ARD database at the beginning, middle and end of
the period covered by the study. 
Table A1: Number of Enterprises in Northern Ireland ARD
1973 1981 1993
By Sector
Food and Drink  125 104 129
Textiles and Clothing 278 166 122
Engineering 174 148 222
Other Manufacturing 142 104 148
By Sizeband (average employment)
20-49 employees 263 171 311
50-249 employees 344 266 242
250 plus employees 112 85 68
By Sizeband (initial employment)
20-49 employees 255 178 342
50-249 employees 331 246 212
250 plus employees 133 98 67
By Ownership 
Indigenously-owned na 480 572
Externally-owned na 42 49
Notes: See text for details of construction of database.
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